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1. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is an important field in economics; it studies how
people make decisions amid conflict and cooperation. Various
experiments have been carried to study the way people play those
games, and economists study those data for various purposes.
There has been a rise of need for using artificial agents to simulate
the game, since we could save the cost of hiring human subjects
for the experiments, and we could gain more control over the
experiment settings.
We are focusing on a particular field in game theory called
Bayesian game, or game with incomplete information. In this kind
of game the players have only part of the information, such as the
payoff they receive when they make a move. In order to play well
in this kind of game, players need to conjecture the structure of
the game and make inferences about the actions and thoughts of
the other players.
We gather data from the Market Entry Prediction Contest. They
have carried a market entry game experiment in Harvard
University; it is a 4-person repeated game with different parameter
sets for different games. 120 people are divided into 30 4-person
subgroups, and those subgroups will play 10 games; each game
has 50 repeated trials or rounds. The players only have
information about the obtained payoff, which is the payoff they
receive, and the forgone payoff, which is the payoff they would
have received if they had chosen the other strategy. They do not
know the actions and payoffs of the other players, and they are
unaware of the payoff matrix, or any structures of the game
mechanisms.
Various models have been proposed to build the artificial agent
for this game, such as Reinforcement Learning (RL), Fictitious
Play (FL), Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) [4] [5], and
the Inertia, Weighting, and Sampling (I-SAW) model [6]. There
has been a contest for new models that can make decent

predictions on the real data; contestants are given the estimation
data set and are tested on the competition data set. Since the study
is related different fields such as machine learning, economics,
psychology, and neuroscience, The best model seems to take into
consideration all of these fields, and combine the findings to
simulate the process of playing the game. The objective of this
research is to study various effects in the market entry game, and
improve upon existing models on the prediction of the entry rate.

2. BOUNDED RATIONALITY, MEMORY,
DEVIATION FROM THEORY
There are a lot of noises or variations in the environment when we
conduct economics experiment in real life, and the result deviate
from the predictions of theories. It has been found that differences
in the experimental environment can play a huge role in the result
[1]. We need to account for those various factors that are affecting
the result of the experiments, make appropriate assumptions, and
adjust our theories accordingly.
One finding of the market entry game is that there are more entries
than predicted by Nash Equilibrium [2]. This excess entry
suggests that human beings are not very rational in the market
entry games. Studies on other market entry games also have
similar findings [4]. Some modification of the models is required
to take into consideration the bounded rationality and intelligence
of human beings. We could discount the effect of learning, make
the attraction lower for all in EWA, or add a random factor such
as a discount factor on the equation to calculate the probability for
each strategy.
We need to account for the heterogeneity of players. They have
different preferences, rationality, intelligence, learning abilities,
willingness to play well, incentives, and engagement level with
the game. We also need to account for the small population of
people just play randomly. If possible, we should also account for
different behaviors in repeated games in game theory, such
as reputation building, strategic teaching, and cooperation. We
need to build models that can fit with QRE (Quantal Response
Equilibrium), which allows human players to make mistakes
during games.
In particular, we want to study the effect of bounded memory,
which states that human beings could only remember a certain
amount of information. Most of the proposed the models assume
the players have perfect memories; in reality, the players would
not be able to remember everything from previous rounds.

3. RECENCY EFFECT

It is an essentially a reinforcement learning problem, where the
player is trying to learn about the world. The player is sometimes
in exploration mode, and sometimes in exploitation mode, which
means he sometimes tries to learn as much as he can, and
sometimes he wants to use what he has learnt to get a better
reward. Therefore the player is not stationary, he has different
motives at different times. We want to examine how does the
player change his behaviors throughout the game. Specifically, we
are interested in the recency effect, and how it is changing during
a game.
Recency effect states that the most recent round is most important
for the player; all the other rounds are roughly equally important
[7]. We could examine the effect of recency by adding it to each
of the time period and study if there are differences among those
time periods.

obtained and foregone payoff. If the obtained payoff is higher
than the foregone payoff, then keep the current strategy, otherwise
switch to the other strategy. In other words, at that trial the
artificial agent will play the game from scratch.
After conducting those experiments it is found that the recency
and limited memory effect is strongest at the mid-range of the
game. Possible explanation is that the player is in exploration
mode at the beginning, so will be very sensitive to the differences
in the obtained payoff and forgone payoff, they cannot afford to
forget the previous experiences, and the recency effect is weak;
near the end of the game the player might be reluctant to learn
new information, thus reply heavily on the previous experiences,
making the recency effect low.

4. IMPLEMENTAION
We implemented the simulation in Java. Various classes are
created for various models. I made a class to integrate the recency
and limited memory effects into the EWA model.
We use the self-tuning EWA model to make various
improvements, since it has less free parameters to tune that raw
EWA, it is a good combination of FL and FP, and unlike I-SAW,
which takes into consideration many specific things of this market
entry game, it is more generalized and have more room to
improve. I-SAW might have the danger of over-fitting, since it
has so many free parameters to tune.
We will use the official measuring criteria from the Market Entry
Prediction Contest, which include three categories: entry rate,
efficiency, and alternation. Entry rate is the proportion of time the
players choose the option of entering in one round on average;
efficiency is the average payoff in one round the players have
gained; alternation is the proportion of time the players switch
strategies in one round on average. Here we are mainly looking at
the entry rate. Mean Squared Deviation (MSD) is used to measure
the difference between the prediction of the simulations from the
artificial agents and the actual data done by the human subjects.
We want to isolate a single effect, observe that effect in the
context of a smaller period of time, and attempt to find how the
effect changes over the course of a repeated game. In particular,
we examine if there is a period in which the player is most
sensitive to the most recent payoffs or when the recency and
limited memory effect is strongest, and if there is a period in
which it is more beneficial for the player to start from scratch by
ignoring previous experiences.
We attempt to divide the game of 50 trials into 10 periods of 5
trials and examine the effect in each period. Some pattern is found
and further division is desired, so we divide the game into 50 time
blocks and the recency and limited memory effect on each.

5. EXPERIMENT 1
We run 50 tests to study the effect of recency and limited memory.
For each test we run 10-fold cross-validation on the 40 games; we
run each game 2000 times and take the average of the results. For
each of the test we study the effect of recency and limited memory
on a particular trial, starting from trial 0 and ends with trial 49; at
that trial the artificial agent forget about his experience from
previous rounds and only look at the result of the most recent

Figure 1: The prediction on the average entry rate on the
competition set against the round at which there is a memory
reset.

6. EXPERIMENT II
We attempt to form a new model that is a integration of the
recency and limited memory effect into the EWA model. We keep
the logic response of the EWA model when calculating the
probability for each strategy, and maintain its structure of
updating the attraction. However, we will add recency and limited
memory effect with some probability at some trials, based on the
pattern found from the previous experiments. Various experiments
are conducted, each with a different set of trials in which recency
and limited memory effect take place, and each with different
settings of other parameters, such as the probability of having this
effect on that round. Various considerations such as the effect of
loss aversion are also made to see they will make a difference on
the performance. Again, for each test we run 10-fold crossvalidation on the 40 games, and we run each game 2000 times.
It is found that a recency model with probability of 40% from trial
5 to 20, and from trial 25 to 40 have the best performance on the
estimation set. Further experiment on the competition set also
shows that it is doing well in predicting the entry rate, as shown
on Figure 2. Although it is not doing well on the prediction of
efficiency and alternation, it outperforms the current best model
(I-SAW) on the prediction of entry rate. In other words, when we
only want to focus on the entry rate, this hybrid model does the
best job in predicting that. It also is fast to compute, with only two
parameters to tune.
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